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“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”1 
 
- CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS 
 
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak 
openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution 
with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial 
discrimination.”2 
 
- ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SONYA SOTOMAYOR 
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 *  Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School. 
1 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 
(2007). 
2 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Does the Constitution compel states to desegregate their schools? 
 
Yes.
3
 
 
 Does the Constitution compel states to recognize interracial 
 marriages? 
 
Yes.
4
 
 
Does the Constitution compel states to recognize same-sex marriage? 
 
Arguably, yes.
5
 
 
 Does the Constitution compel states to treat people differently on the 
 basis of race? 
 
No. 
 
The way to stop judicial supremacy is for judges to stop acting like 
judicial supremacists. The way to ensure equal and accessible democratic 
processes is to make our democracy more equal and accessible. If the 
Constitution gave nine members of the Supreme Court the authority to 
undo the choices of millions simply to achieve better policy outcomes, 
then the Court would have the power to make constitutional laws 
unconstitutional and unconstitutional laws constitutional. That would 
lead to inequality in a manner far worse—and more undemocratic—than 
the alleged inequality that resulted from Michigan‟s ban on race-based 
preferences. Citizens of all political persuasions would be subject to a 
federal judicial veto, regardless of the Constitution, or the results of 
democratic debate. 
Justice Sotomayor‟s provocative dissent in Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action
6—called “courageous” by Attorney General 
Eric Holder
7—rightfully argued for a candid discussion on race: 
                                                                                                             
3 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, 
§ 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”). 
4 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
5 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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[W]e ought not sit back and wish away, rather than 
confront, the racial inequality that exists in our society. 
It is this view that works harm, by perpetuating the facile 
notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the 
simple truth that race does matter.
8
 
While courageous, the dissent was not correct. 
Race does matter. The Supreme Court, however, is not the proper 
venue to have this candid discussion. To imply that it should, and that the 
Constitution should be interpreted with “eyes open,”9 is to suggest that 
“we” refers to nine unelected judges, and that “ought” should be defined 
by the federal judiciary. Neither view is healthy for democracy or 
equality. “We” refers to the citizens of every state, and “ought” belongs 
to the democratic process. 
Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent, although noble in purpose, is 
fundamentally undemocratic. As discussed below, the reasoning reflects 
a philosophy that gives courts the power to make normative policy 
judgments, and to condition constitutional meaning on subjective 
assessments regarding the wisdom of state policy. There is no such thing, 
however, as an unconstitutional policy. There is only an unconstitutional 
law. And laws must comport with the Constitution‟s text, not the other 
way around. 
By authoring such a pointed, political, and doctrinally suspect 
dissent, Justice Sotomayor made it more difficult to have a candid 
discussion about race. She also made it more difficult to believe that 
judges will respect the law—and the Constitution—even when it 
conflicts with their personal values. That not only undermines the 
public‟s faith in the Court, but it demeans every citizen‟s fundamental 
right to resolve divisive policy issues through democratic means. To be 
sure, it is one thing to invalidate democratically enacted laws that violate 
constitutional liberties. It is quite another, however, to manipulate, 
ignore, or unreasonably interpret the Constitution‟s text to reach a 
desired policy outcome. The result does not lead to equality. It denies 
citizens of all races the ability to have a principled discourse on divisive 
                                                                                                             
6 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1651-83. 
7 Todd Ruger, Sotomayor‟s Dissent was „Courageous,‟ Holder Says, LEGAL TIMES 
(April 23, 2014 1:28 PM), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=12026522
79348/Sotomayor‟s-Affirmative-Action-Dissent-Was-‟Courageous,‟-Holder-Says?slretur
n=20140403144037 (accessed by searching for LegalTimes in LEXIS NEXIS, legal 
news). 
8 Schuette, 134 S.Ct. at 1676 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (alteration to original in 
quoted text). 
9 Id. 
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social policy issues, and prevents citizens from being agents of change. 
Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent, therefore, highlights the problem of relying 
on the Court to create rights. With each decision removing an issue from 
the democratic process, power is a bit more centralized, and liberty a bit 
more federalized. 
A candid discussion about race, however, is essential. 
Discrimination—and its effects—exist throughout the country.10 
Inequality is real, not imagined. Affirmative action, while valuable to 
ensuring diversity in higher education, is an incomplete fix. It masks, but 
does not alleviate, the deeper racial injustices that continue to this day. 
Those injustices result from an inescapable truth: the promise of Brown 
v. Board of Education
11
 has never been realized.
12
 African-Americans 
continue to live in a world of unequal opportunity and, in some areas, 
segregated schools. Many live in poverty and receive an inadequate 
education. Enacting local, state, and federal policies that address the root 
causes of inequality is thus a civil and human rights imperative. A 
discussion that includes and empowers only nine judges, however, will 
be anything but candid, most likely divisive, and most certainly 
unproductive. 
II. SCHUETTE V. COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
In Schuette, Justice Kennedy authored a plurality opinion upholding 
a constitutional amendment passed by Michigan voters (Proposition 2), 
that banned race-based preferences among state and governmental 
entities.
13
 The Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action challenged the 
                                                                                                             
10 Schuette, 134 S.Ct. at 1676 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (alteration to original in 
quoted text). 
11 Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
12 See Rotan E. Lee, Equality: Truth and Consequence, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 263 (1995) (discussing post-Brown failures, including poverty, inadequate 
schooling, and segregation). 
13 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1678 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Proposition 2 was 
passed by a fifty-eight to forty-two percent margin and became Article I, § 26, of the 
Michigan Constitution. Section 26 states, in relevant part, as follows: 
(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne 
State University, and any other public college or university, 
community college, or school district shall not discriminate against, 
or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis 
of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of 
public employment, public education, or public contracting. 
(2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential 
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, 
public education, or public contracting. 
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law, arguing that it violated the Equal Protection Clause by altering the 
political structure and making it more difficult for minorities to effect 
changes in policy.
14
 Before voters passed Proposition 2, the governing 
bodies at Michigan‟s public universities administered affirmative action 
programs.
15
 After Proposition 2 passed, minority groups could only seek 
change through a statewide ballot initiative.
16
 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Michigan, 
holding that its voters were permitted to limit the means by which 
minority groups could secure advantages based on racial classifications.
17
 
By a 2-1 vote, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Proposition 2 
violated the equal protection clause.
18
 On re-hearing en banc, a divided 
Sixth Circuit affirmed.
19
 The Court granted certiorari, and reversed. 
A. The Plurality Opinion 
1. Deference to the Democratic Process 
Justice Kennedy‟s plurality opinion emphasized that the issue “is not 
about the constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious admissions 
policies in higher education.”20 Instead, it concerned “whether, and in 
what manner, voters in the States may choose to prohibit the 
consideration of racial preferences in governmental decisions, in 
particular with respect to school admissions.”21 At its core, Schuette was 
about who should decide: the Court or the democratic process; however, 
it was about much more. The tide is beginning to turn against living 
constitutionalists and policy-driven jurists. Even Justice Kennedy, who 
has often crafted opinions filled with sweeping language about liberty, 
agreed. 
                                                                                                             
(3) For the purposes of this section „state‟ includes, but is not 
necessarily limited to, the state itself, any city, county, any public 
college, university, or community college, school district, or other 
political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within the 
State of Michigan not included in sub-section 1. 
14 Id. at 1682.  
15 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of University of Mich., 539 F. 
Supp. 2d 924, 933 (E.D. Mich. 2008), overruled by Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014). 
16 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 957. 
17 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630; see also Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 
F.Supp. 2d at 933. 
18 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630 (the Sixth Circuit relied, in part, on Washington v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1998)). 
19 Id. at 1630; see also Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of 
University of Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012). 
20 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630. 
21 Id. 
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The plurality held that the United States Constitution gives this 
choice to Michigan‟s voters. Relying on Grutter v. Bollinger,22 where the 
Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School‟s affirmative 
action program,
23
 Justice Kennedy emphasized “the significance of a 
dialogue regarding this contested and complex policy question among 
and within states.”24 Michigan‟s decision to ban race-based preferences, 
“reflect[ed] in part the national dialogue regarding the wisdom and 
practicality of race-conscious admissions in higher education.”25 
Furthermore, by “enabling greater citizen involvement in democratic 
processes,”26 the Constitution gave citizens the authority to make these 
choices. Justice Kennedy explained as follows: 
This case is not about how the debate about racial 
preferences should be resolved. It is about who may 
resolve it. There is no authority in the Constitution of the 
United States or in this Court‟s precedents for the 
Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this 
policy determination to the voters . . . Deliberative 
debate on sensitive issues such as racial preferences all 
too often may shade into rancor. But that does not justify 
removing certain court-determined issues from the 
voters‟ reach. Democracy does not presume that some 
subjects are either too divisive or too profound for public 
debate.
27
 
In short, the democratic process “is impeded, not advanced, by court 
decrees based on the proposition that the public cannot have the requisite 
repose to discuss certain issues.”28 
The plurality also recognized that excessive judicial intervention 
undermines personal liberty. Justice Kennedy wrote that “our 
constitutional system embraces . . . the right of citizens to debate so they 
can learn and decide and then, through the political process, act in 
concert to try to shape the course of their own times and the course of a 
nation that must strive always to make freedom ever greater and more 
secure.”29 Liberty, therefore, is not defined solely by outcomes, but also 
“embraces the right, indeed the duty, to engage in a rational, civic 
                                                                                                             
22 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
23 Id. at 343. 
24 Schuette, 134 S.Ct.at 1630 (plurality opinion). 
25 Id. (alteration to original in quoted text). 
26 Id. (quoting Bond v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2355 (2011)). 
27 Id. at 1638.(emphasis added) 
28 Id. at 1637. 
29 Schuette, 134 S.Ct. at 1637. 
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discourse in order to determine how best to form a consensus to shape 
the destiny of the Nation and its people.”30 
2. Rejecting an Unprincipled Expansion of the Political 
Process Doctrine 
The Court rejected an expansive reading of the political process 
doctrine,
31
 and distinguished three earlier cases that the petitioner and 
Sixth Circuit had deemed controlling. First, in Reitman v. Mulkey,
32
 
voters amended the California Constitution to prohibit the state from 
interfering with an owner‟s decision to refuse to sell residential property, 
regardless of the reason.
33
 The Court held that the amendment violated 
equal protection principles because the “immediate design and intent”34 
of the amendment was to “establis[h] a purported constitutional right to 
privately discriminate.”35 It also “significantly encourage[d] and 
involve[d] the State in private racial discriminations.”36 
In Hunter v. Erickson,
37
 the Court created the political process 
doctrine, which prohibits states from “alter[ing] the procedures of 
government to target racial minorities.”38 The Hunter Court invalidated a 
voter-approved amendment to the city charter requiring that all anti-
discrimination laws be passed through the referendum process.
39
 Voters 
passed the amendment in response to a fair housing ordinance that 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of race,
40
 in an area “where 
widespread racial discrimination . . . led to segregated housing, forcing 
many to live in „unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded 
conditions.‟”41 Given this context, the Court rejected the city‟s argument 
that the amendment was “simply . . . a public decision to move slowly in 
                                                                                                             
30 Id. 
31 See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1967) (“Like the law requiring 
specification of candidates‟ race on the ballot . . . § 137 places [a] special burden on 
racial minorities within the governmental process. This is no more permissible than 
denying them the vote, on an equal basis with others.”) (alteration to original in quoted 
text). 
32 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
33 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1631 (plurality opinion). 
34 Id. (quoting Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374). 
35 Id. (alteration in original). 
36 Id. (alterations in original). 
37 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 385 (1969). 
38 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1632 (2014) 
(plurality opinion). 
39 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391. 
40 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1640 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 
391). 
41 Id. 
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the delicate area of race relations.”42 Instead, it was a thinly veiled 
justification to continue discriminatory practices.
43
 Also, by requiring 
that only anti-discrimination ordinances be approved by referendum, the 
amendment “place[d] [a] special burden on racial minorities within the 
governmental process.”44 
Finally, in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,
45
 voters 
passed a state initiative that prohibited busing to desegregate schools.
46
 
In doing so, the initiative “remov[ed] the authority to address a racial 
problem—and only a racial problem—from the existing decision making 
body, in such a way as to burden minority interests.”47 Specifically, the 
initiative forced busing advocates to “seek relief from the state 
legislature, or from the statewide electorate,”48 by using the “racial 
nature of a decision to determine the decision making process.”49 
Moreover, the initiative “was carefully tailored to interfere only with 
desegregative busing,”50 and thus resulted in an “aggravation of the very 
racial injury in which the State itself was complicit.”51 
Thus, in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 and other cases, 
the laws at issue presented a “serious risk, if not purpose, of causing 
specific injuries on account of race,”52 and made it more difficult to 
achieve change through the legislative process. In Schuette, however, 
neither discrimination nor the likelihood of serious injury to minority 
groups was reducible from a color-blind policy.
53
 Furthermore, the 
plurality refused to construe the political process doctrine so broadly that 
it would apply strict scrutiny to “any state action with a „racial focus‟54 
that makes it „more difficult for certain racial minorities than for other 
groups‟ to „achieve legislation that is in their interest.‟”55 That would 
force the Court to identify interests that were common to particular 
minority groups, and risk precisely the type of “impermissible racial 
                                                                                                             
42 Id. 
43 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1640 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
44 Id. (alterations to original in quoted text). 
45 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
46 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1632-33 (plurality opinion). 
47 Id. at 1633 (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 454, 474 (1982)) (alteration to original 
in quoted text). 
48 Id. (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 474). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 471). 
51 Id. 
52 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633. 
53 See, e.g., Sailors v. Board of Ed. of Kent County, 387 U.S. 105, 109 (1967) (“Save 
and unless the state, county, or municipal government runs afoul of a federally protected 
right, it has vast leeway in the management of its internal affairs.”). 
54 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (citing Hunter, 385 U.S. at 395). 
55 Id. 
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stereotyp[ing]”56 that equal protection principles prohibit. Justice 
Kennedy stated as follows: 
Were courts to embark upon this venture not only would 
it be undertaken with no clear legal standards or 
accepted sources to guide judicial decision but also it 
would result in, or at least impose a high risk of, 
inquiries and categories dependent upon demeaning 
stereotypes, classifications of questionable 
constitutionality on their own terms.
57
 
The plurality refused to assume that “members of the same racial 
group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the 
community in which they live—think alike, share the same political 
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.”58 Indeed, if “it 
were deemed necessary to probe how some races define their own 
interest in political matters, still another beginning point would be to 
define individuals according to race.”59 Therefore, a broad application of 
the political process doctrine had “no principled limitation . . . [or] 
support in precedent.”60 It would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
identify laws that “inures primarily to the benefit of the minority”61 or 
are “in their interest.”62 
The plurality emphasized that issues involving affirmative action, 
and other matters of social policy that cannot be said to violate the 
Constitution, should be resolved through the democratic process. By 
banning race-based preferences, “the Michigan voters exercised their 
privilege to enact laws as a basic exercise of their democratic power.”63 
In so holding, the plurality recognized that “freedom does not stop with 
individual rights . . . [and] consists, in one of its essential dimensions, of 
the right of the individual not to be injured by the unlawful exercise of 
governmental power.”64 Thus, “courts may not disempower the voters 
                                                                                                             
56 Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)) (alteration to original in 
quoted text). 
57 Id. at 1634-35. 
58 Id. (citing Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647). 
59 Id. 
60 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634. 
61 Id. at 1635 (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 472, 474) (alteration to original in 
quoted text). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1636-37. 
64 Id. (alteration to original in quoted text). 
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from choosing which path to follow [on the use of race-based 
preferences].”65 
B. Justice Sotomayor‟s Blistering Dissent 
Justice Sotomayor began her uncharacteristically pointed dissent by 
writing that “[w]e are fortunate to live in a democratic society,”66 and 
discussed the perils of judge-made law.
67
 Then, she did exactly what she 
cautioned against. 
To begin with, Justice Sotomayor wrote that Proposition 2 reflected 
the “last chapter of discrimination,”68 in a long and disgraceful history 
that she reminded the Court of in great detail. After discussing the “long 
and lamentable record of stymieing the right of racial minorities to 
participate in the political process,”69 Justice Sotomayor emphasized that 
“our Constitution places limits on what a majority of the people may 
do.”70 In this case, despite conceding that Proposition 2 did not 
invidiously discriminate and would not necessarily have a disparate 
impact on minority groups,
71
 Justice Sotomayor argued that the Equal 
Protection Clause imposed those limits. 
Instead, Proposition 2 violated a “strand of our equal protection 
jurisprudence [that] focuses on process, securing to all citizens the right 
to participate meaningfully and equally in self-government.”72 As Justice 
Sotomayor explained, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a political 
structure that “subtly distorts governmental processes in such a way as to 
place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve 
beneficial legislation.”73 That doctrine applied here because Michigan‟s 
voters “changed the basic rules of the political process . . . by amending 
the Michigan Constitution to enact Art. I, § 26 . . . .”74   
The change Justice Sotomayor spoke against was change in a 
democratic sense. The Michigan Constitution, like its federal 
counterpart, gave voters the right to seek change through the amendment 
process. To Justice Sotomayor, the amendment process was the wrong 
                                                                                                             
65 Id. (emphasis added). 
66 Id. at 1651 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1652. 
69 Id. at 1651. 
70 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634. 
71 Id. at n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I of course do not mean to suggest that 
Michigan‟s voters acted with anything like the invidious intent . . . of those who 
historically stymied the rights of racial minorities.”). 
72 Id. at 1651 (emphasis added). 
73 Id. at 1653 (citing Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 
(1982)). 
74 Id. at 1653-54 (emphasis added). 
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kind of democracy solely because the result “uniquely disadvantaged 
racial minorities.”75 Therefore, the solution was to restrict, not expand, 
the channels by which voters could seek change. Indeed, Justice 
Sotomayor argued that voters could petition “each institution‟s governing 
board,
76
 whose members were “nominated by political parties and 
elected by the citizenry in statewide elections.”77 This included 
“persuad[ing] existing board members to change their minds through 
individual or grassroots lobbying efforts, or through general public 
awareness campaigns.”78 But nowhere else, and certainly not through the 
democratic process. 
What makes this particularly alarming is that “Michigan‟s elected 
boards „delegated admissions-related decision making authority to 
unelected university faculty members and administrators.‟”79 As Justice 
Breyer wrote in his concurrence, even if there was a change in the 
political process, it was to remove this issue from “unelected actors and 
place it in the hands of the voters.”80 Tellingly, Justice Sotomayor found 
fault with an inherently democratic process that she equated to “stacking 
the political process against minority groups permanently, forcing the 
minority alone to surmount unique obstacles in pursuit of its goals.”81 
Make no mistake, Justice Sotomayor wanted to cut off the amendment 
process for only those voters seeking to ban race-conscious admissions 
policies, and to compel them to seek policy change solely from 
unelected—and unaccountable—faculty members. Anyone who has been 
to a faculty meeting knows that change in this forum is like trying to 
convince an originalist that the Constitution‟s meaning is best understood 
by looking to the European Court of Human Rights. 
Put differently, Justice Sotomayor would have placed specific limits 
on the then-minority‟s ability to “participate meaningfully and equally in 
self-government.”82 In so doing, Justice Sotomayor targeted a specific 
group in the same manner that she deemed unconstitutional when applied 
to the group she favored. And she used the political process doctrine to 
make the political process less accessible to voters and those who 
opposed affirmative action. This violated the precedent upon which 
Justice Sotomayor relied, and the principle—equality—that she sought to 
protect. 
                                                                                                             
75 Id. at 1652. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1653 (alteration to original in quoted text). 
79 Id. at 1650 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
80 Id. at 1664 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
81 Id. at 1654. 
82 Id. at 1651. 
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To be sure, although the administration of race-conscious policies 
was “in the hands of each institution‟s governing board,”83 it did not 
prevent citizens from seeking policy change through an amendment 
process that had been in place for nearly a century.
84
 In doing precisely 
that, voters changed what the law said, not how changes to the law could 
be made. Moreover, the notion that voters were “stacking the political 
process against minority groups”85 also begged the question why voters 
would “undertake the daunting task of amending the State 
Constitution,”86 as the preferred method to execute such a plan. As 
Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, if the voters sought to ban race-
conscious policies through the university‟s governing boards, “it would 
have made it harder not easier, for racial minorities favoring affirmative 
action to overturn that decision.”87 Indeed, “voting in a favorable board 
(each of which has eight members) at the three major public universities 
requires electing by majority vote at least 15 different candidates, several 
of whom would be running during different election cycles.”88 
Ultimately, Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent embraced a results-driven 
jurisprudence that, although courageous and well-intentioned, was not 
supported by the Court‟s precedent nor by the Constitution‟s text. 
Furthermore, the reasoning would have led to an unreasonable, 
unworkable, and unconstitutional expansion of the political process 
doctrine. Coming from a life-tenured and unelected judge, that makes it 
dangerous—and undemocratic. Unlike Reitman, Hunter, and 
Washington, where voters prohibited the state from remedying 
discrimination, barred new anti-discrimination laws (except by 
referendum), and banned a practice intended to desegregate schools, 
Michigan‟s voters did not restructure the political processes in a way that 
disadvantaged certain minority groups seeking change. The voters did 
not block the state from enforcing or expanding anti-discrimination 
efforts. As Justice Breyer explained in his concurring opinion, Hunter 
and Seattle involved efforts to “manipulate the political process in a way 
not here at issue.”89 Furthermore, by attacking Chief Justice Roberts, 
Justice Sotomayor wrote with the wrong kind of candor. 
                                                                                                             
83 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1651. 
84 Id. at 1645-47 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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87 Id. at 1645 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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C. Justice Scalia‟s Concurrence 
Justice Scalia‟s concurrence argued that, absent a discriminatory 
intent, impact, or a true subversion of the democratic process, laws that 
treat people equally do not violate the Equal Protection Clause: 
Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbid what its text plainly requires? 
Needless to say (except that this case obliges us to say 
it), the question answers itself. “The Constitution 
proscribes government discrimination on the basis of 
race, and state-provided education is no exception.” It is 
precisely this understanding—the correct 
understanding—of the federal Equal Protection Clause 
that the people of the State of Michigan have adopted for 
their own fundamental law. By adopting it, they did not 
simultaneously offend it.
90
 
On the other hand, if “a public university . . . stake[d] its defense of a 
race-based-admissions policy on the ground that it was designed to 
benefit primarily minorities (as opposed to all students, regardless of 
color, by enhancing diversity), we would hold the policy 
unconstitutional.”91 
 As Justice Scalia recognized, the political process doctrine 
cannot lead to a workable equal protection jurisprudence. Specifically, 
“[t]he problems with the political-process doctrine begin with its 
triggering prong, which assigns to a court the task of determining 
whether a law that reallocates policymaking authority concerns a „racial 
issue.‟”92 To answer that question, judges would be required to “focus 
their guesswork on their own juridical sense of what is primarily for the 
benefit of minorities,”93 and ask whether “minorities may consider the 
policy in question to be „in their interest.‟”94 Such a task necessarily 
“involves judges in the dirty business of dividing the Nation „into racial 
blocs‟ . . . [and] promotes the noxious fiction that, knowing only a 
person‟s color or ethnicity, we can be sure that he has a predetermined 
set of policy „interests.‟”95 Moreover, it “reinforc[es] the perception that 
                                                                                                             
90 Id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
91 Id. at 1640 (alteration to original in quoted text). 
92 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1643 (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 
457, 473 (1982)). 
93 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
94 Id. (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 474). 
95 Id. (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 60, 610 (1990)) 
(quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)) (alteration to original in quoted text). 
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members of the same racial group . . . think alike, [and] share the same 
political interests.”96 Perhaps Justice Sotomayor is better situated to 
identify minority interests because she is a member of a minority group. 
But to make that suggestion is to harbor assumptions that are born of 
ignorance, stereotype, and prejudice. It has no place in the world of 
constitutional jurisprudence—or anywhere else. 
Additionally, the dissent failed to explain “why the election of a 
university‟s governing board is a „political process which can ordinarily 
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,‟ but why 
Michigan voters‟ ability to amend their Constitution is not.”97 Justice 
Scalia stated as follows: 
It seems to me quite the opposite. Amending the 
Constitution requires the approval of only “a majority of 
the electors voting on the question.” Mich. Const., Art. 
XII, § 2. By contrast, voting in a favorable board (each 
of which has eight members) at the three major public 
universities requires electing by majority vote at least 15 
different candidates, several of whom would be running 
during different election cycles . . . So if Michigan 
voters, instead of amending their Constitution, had 
pursued the dissent‟s preferred path of electing board 
members promising to “abolish race-sensitive 
admissions policies,” . . . it would have been harder, not 
easier, for racial minorities favoring affirmative action to 
overturn that decision.
98
 
Scalia also questioned Justice Sotomayor‟s argument that “amending 
Michigan‟s Constitution is simply not a part of that State‟s „existing‟ 
political process.”99 He stated as follows: 
What a peculiar notion: that a revision of a State‟s 
fundamental law, made in precisely the manner that law 
prescribes, by the very people who are the source of that 
                                                                                                             
96 Id. at 1644 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647) (alteration to 
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97 Id. at 1645 (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 
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law‟s authority, is not part of the “political process” 
which, but for those people and that law, would not 
exist. This will surely come as news to the people of 
Michigan, who, since 1914, have amended their 
Constitution 20 times.
100
 
The amendment did not alter “the basic rules of the political process 
in . . . the middle of the game,”101 but instead used an essential part of 
that process, “through which citizens could seek legislative change.”102 
Michigan‟s voters chose to create a color-blind society; it would be 
“shameful for us to stand in their way,”103 and “doubly shameful to 
equate „the majority‟ behind § 26 with „the majority‟ responsible for Jim 
Crow.”104 As Justice Scalia stated, “no good can come of such random 
judicial musing.”105 
D. Chief Justice Roberts Concurs—and Responds to Justice 
Sotomayor 
Chief Justice Roberts chastised Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent as 
“devot[ing] 11 pages to expounding its own policy preferences in favor 
of taking race into account in college admissions.”106 Roberts also 
highlighted the irony in the dissent‟s statement: it “do[es] not . . . suggest 
that the virtues of adopting race-sensitive admissions policies should 
inform the legal question before the Court.”107 He also questioned Justice 
Sotomayor‟s conclusion that governing boards may permissibly decide to 
ban race-based preferences in university admissions, “[b]ut others 
[voters] who might reach the same conclusion are failing to take race 
seriously.”108 
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts defended his statement that “the way 
to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the 
basis of race.”109 Roberts wrote that it was not “out of touch with reality 
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to conclude that racial preferences . . . do more harm than good.”110 
Roberts also wrote that disagreement “on the costs and benefits of racial 
preferences is not to „wish away, rather than confront‟ racial 
inequality.”111 Rather, “[p]eople can disagree in good faith on this issue, 
but it similarly does more harm than good to question the openness and 
candor of those on either side of the debate.”112 
III. WHO WAS RIGHT, AND WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN NEXT? 
No Justice was entirely correct, and none were entirely wrong. 
Justice Sotomayor correctly noted that racism and social inequality—
both public and private—still exist. Their effects have, among other 
things, caused many to live in poverty, led to inequality in our 
educational system, and unequal treatment in the criminal justice system. 
Justice Sotomayor was wrong, however, to embrace a view of the equal 
protection clause that would have deprived Michigan from not 
discriminating, and to suggest that, in fact, they were required to 
discriminate. No reading of the Constitution, and no reasonable 
conception of equality, could support such a proposition. The equal 
protection clause does not compel the states to treat people differently on 
the basis of race. Nor does it prohibit states from passing laws that treat 
people the same, particularly where neither a discriminatory intent nor a 
strong likelihood of disparate impact is present. 
Just as the Constitution constrains majorities, so too does it constrain 
the Court. Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent was not about imposing 
constitutional constraints on democratic majorities. Those constraints, 
when properly applied, are an essential element of a constitutional 
democracy. Instead, her dissent imposed one Justice‟s subjective 
constraints on the citizens of Michigan, and cast aspersions on the Court 
itself. If able, Justice Sotomayor might have imposed those constraints 
on an entire nation. That is not only a problem. It prevents real solutions. 
The Supreme Court and our democratic process do not countenance 
such an arrangement. Indeed, if we allow the Court to manipulate—or 
ignore—the Constitution‟s text, its own precedent, and duly enacted state 
laws then our system of governance will turn on its head. Citizens are left 
on the outside looking in, disempowered to act as change agents, and 
subject to policy preferences that depend on the Court‟s composition, not 
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constitutional law. Although Justice Sotomayor is correct that equal and 
accessible democratic processes are essential to ensuring liberty for all 
races, there is nothing equal or accessible about giving the Court 
unrestrained power to right every perceived wrong. 
Ultimately, Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent highlights a deeper problem: 
we often look to the Court as a right-creating institution, even where the 
power to create the right in question is, at best, dubious. That approach 
threatens a participatory democracy because judges too often take the 
bait. To be sure, although much of the Constitution‟s text is ambiguous, 
judges cannot treat it like a political football and massage its language 
like clay when they prefer a particular outcome. The text does not mean 
what Justice Sotomayor wants it to mean, or what any judge thinks it 
should mean. To believe otherwise is to create a top-down system of 
governance where Justices can undo the choices of a democratic majority 
because they disagree with—or dislike—those choices. Sadly, 
disagreement with Michigan‟s decision to ban race-based preferences—
not law—is precisely what drove Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent. What she 
tried to do was precisely what no judge should do, no matter how noble 
the purpose. As Justice Anthony Kennedy states, “[a]ny society that 
relies on nine unelected judges to resolve the most serious issues of the 
day is not a functioning democracy.”113 It is no democracy at all. 
Justice Sotomayor justifiably called for a candid discussion on race-
related issues. The Court certainly has a role in this discussion. It should, 
for example, continue to invalidate laws, like those in Hunter and Seattle 
School District that targeted minority groups. In addition, the Court 
should take a more active role in enforcing fundamental constitutional 
rights. In Gideon v. Wainwright,
114
 the Court held that indigent criminal 
defendants have a constitutional right to counsel.
115
 Public defender 
systems, however, remain underfunded.
116
 In Strickland v. 
Washington,
117
 the Court created a two-pronged test for determining 
counsel‟s effectiveness at trial, but it has rarely found instances where 
counsel was, in fact, ineffective.
118
 Furthermore, the Court can make the 
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democratic process more equal by, among other things, allowing 
Congress to place reasonable limits on corporate and individual 
campaign contributions,
119
 and placing reasonable limits on partisan 
redistricting efforts.
120
 Equal processes lead to fairer outcomes, and allow 
citizens of diverse backgrounds and viewpoints to meaningfully 
participate in the lawmaking process. Of course, empowering citizens, 
not courts, may be the longer path to equality. But it will be the most 
enduring—and democratic—one. 
Legislators at the state and federal level also have important roles to 
play. After Brown, there was much hope that the end of segregation 
would mark the beginning of an enduring equality among all races. 
Sadly, this has not happened. Many schools remain segregated, or are in 
the process of being re-segregated.
121
 Many African-Americans live in 
poverty, receive inadequate education at the primary and secondary level 
and receive unfair treatment in the criminal justice system.
122
 Thus, 
reforming failing public schools, and affirming each citizen‟s right to an 
equal education through, for example, voucher programs or increased 
spending, should be a legislative priority.
123
 Adequately funding public 
defender systems, and ensuring that indigent criminal defendants receive 
effective legal representation, is also critical.
124
 Likewise, legislators 
should aggressively curb state-sanctioned racial profiling, and courts 
should invalidate voter suppression laws, and unconstitutional 
gerrymandering schemes.
125
 These are but a few examples to show that, 
yes, race still matters. So too does misguided judging. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
There are compelling reasons to support affirmative action programs. 
The effects of racial discrimination, and racism itself, remain prevalent 
throughout the country. Pretending otherwise would be to ignore reality. 
Arguing that the Equal Protection Clause compels a state to implement 
race-based affirmative action programs, however, would make a 
mockery of the Constitution. Former Supreme Court Justice Hughes 
famously stated, “at the constitutional level where we work, 90 percent 
of any decision is emotional.”126 The remaining ten percent is “[t]he 
rational part . . . [that] supplies the reasons for supporting our 
predilections.”127 It is time for this type of judging to end. Good 
intentions do not make good decisions, just like good results do not 
necessarily lead to good outcomes. The best outcomes are those that 
result from fair—and constitutional—processes. After all, “[i]t is a sordid 
business, this divvying us up by race.”128 If we keep dividing, the country 
will never be united. 
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